The European Parliament elections, taking place between 6 and 9 June, are fast approaching. Understanding who votes for which political group can help us better understand European politics. In this series, “European Electorates Explored”, we dive into the data with a series of graphs that reveal several characteristics of the voters supporting different political groups in the European Parliament. Today, we examine the voter bases of these groups by focusing on their attitudes about several key topics. What differences emerge across these categories?
Next week, more than 400 million people will have the opportunity to cast their votes for members of the European Parliament (EP). There are eight main groups in the EP: from left to right these are the far-left “The Left” group, the Greens – European Free Alliance, which unites greens with smaller pro-European left-wing parties, the social-democratic Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe group, the European People’s Party (EPP), that unites Christian-democrats and pro-European conservatives, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), that brings together Eurosceptic conservatives and a number of far-right parties, and the fully-fledged far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) group. There is also a group of parties that do not belong to one of these groups: the Non-Inscrits. During the last election, about half of the voters cast their vote for a party but the largest bloc of voters stayed at home and did not vote.
Although much is known about these groups and their member parties, we know very little about the overall characteristics of their voter bases. In this short series of blog posts, we will provide an overview using data from the European Election Study – a large-scale survey conducted just after the previous EP elections in 2019 (for more information, see the methodological justification below).
In Part I of this series, we examined the sociodemographic characteristics of the different voter bases. In Part II we explore their ideas about important political topics. How do they think about the European unification, state intervention in the economy, immigration, environmental protection, and same-sex marriages? We will also examine whether and to what extent these voters describe themselves as left-wing or right-wing.
Let’s start with the key issue of EU integration.
Figure 1: European unification
Note: Respondents could indicate what they think about European unification on a scale ranging from 0 (“Unification has already gone too far”) to 10 (“Unification should be pushed further”). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Too far”, value 5 into “In between” and the values 6-10 into “Further”.
European elections offer voters the opportunity to express their preferences for the future of the European Union. While fundamental questions about integration are addressed in treaties between member states, the European Parliament plays a crucial role in the daily practice of politics, making many smaller decisions that influence whether power lies with the member states or the European Union.
Figure 1 shows how those who vote for different European families think about EU integration. It shows an inverted J-curve. What does that mean? A majority of all groups in the broad ideological political center (from the Greens to the EPP) supports further political unification. This ranges from 55% among supporters of the Greens to 60% among supporters of the S&D and EPP groups.
However, moving to the fringes of the political spectrum, the pattern looks different. Voters for The Left and the right-wing ECR turn out to be very similar. The share of Left voters who think European integration has gone too far is 34%, compared to 37% among ECR supporters. 45% of The Left supporters want more European integration, compared to 43% of the ECR voter base.
The voters of the radical right-wing ID group are even more extreme: a stunning 65% of ID voters believe that European unification has gone too far, while only 19% argue that unification should be pushed further. In other words: even though Euroscepticism is present on both the left and the right, it is much stronger on the right.
Non-voters are also relatively Eurosceptic. 40% of those who did not vote in the previous European elections believe that unification has gone too far, while 36% say unification should go further.
The European Parliament is often conceived of as a supranational institution in favor of further integration. Its overall pro-integration majority reflects the fact that voters who want less EU stay at home.
Figure 2: State intervention in the economy
Note: Respondents could indicate what they think about government intervention in the economy on a scale ranging from 0 (“You fully favour government intervention in the economy”) to 10 (“You fully oppose government intervention in the economy”). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Favor”, value 5 into “In between” and the values 6-10 into “Oppose”.
The European Parliament is a working body that decides on numerous legislative issues, particularly in the economic domain. It sets rules for the internal market, where it can choose to protect consumers and workers with regulations, or provide more space for business innovation.
Figure 2 shows that those who support left-wing parties tend to favor of a stronger role for the government in the economy. Among those who support S&D and the Greens, 42% and 40% respectively favor government intervention. Among supporters of The Left, this percentage is even higher, with 55% in favor of a strong role for the government in the economy. On average, between 20% and 35% of the supporters of these groups oppose government intervention in the economy.
Support for government intervention is weaker among those who vote for right-wing groups in the EP. Among those who vote for Renew, the EPP and ID, the share of voters opposing redistribution is larger than the share supporting it (43% versus 29% for Renew voters, 53% versus 26% for EPP voters and 44% versus 27% for ID voters).
The low percentage of ID voters might surprise those who think the populist right has shifted left on economic issues. Two reasons may explain this. First, while far-right parties often support welfare chauvinism – favoring a strong welfare state for native inhabitants – this is not the same as advocating for a heavily regulated market. Second, far-right supporters typically exhibit low political trust, which reduces their support for government intervention in any area.
Among the ECR voters, the oppose-favor percentages are more balanced: 41% versus 37%. Interestingly, when it comes to a socioeconomic issue like state intervention, ECR voters take the center ground between the social-democrats and liberals.
A similar pattern emerges when examining opinions on income redistribution between the rich and poor (not displayed here). However, it is important to note that the role of the EU – and the European Parliament in particular – in redistributive policies is much smaller.
Finally, those who did not vote during the previous EP elections are not very outspoken on government intervention. 35% of them support intervention, while 35% oppose it.
Figure 3: Immigration
Note: Respondents could indicate what they think about immigration on a scale ranging from 0 (“You fully favour a restrictive policy on immigration”) to 10 (“You fully oppose a restrictive policy on immigration”). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Favor”, value 5 into “In between” and the values 6-10 into “Oppose”.
Migration has been a crucial issue in Europe in recent years. We witnessed the ‘migration crisis’ due to the influx of Syrian refugees, the entry of Ukrainian refugees, and ongoing discussions about strengthening Frontex and striking deals with third countries. Meanwhile, the most important form of migration in EU member states is internal migration within the EU.
To what extent do the voter bases of the different groups in the European Parliament favor restrictive immigration policies? Figure 3 shows that support for immigration is strongest on the left. Voters of particularly The Greens, but also The Left and S&D, are least in favor of restrictive policies (34%, 40% and 42% respectively). As we move from left to right on the political spectrum (and in the graph), the percentage of voters favoring restrictive policies gradually increases: 46% of Renew voters, 49% of EPP voters, 63% of ECR voters, and 68% of ID voters support restrictive policies.
In particular, ECR and ID voters stand out as favoring restrictive policies. This comes as no surprise, given the radical-right ideologies of many of their members. What might be more striking is the relatively restrictive position of Renew voters – the predecessor of which was long led by the highly cosmopolitan Guy Verhofstadt. The relatively right-wing average position of Renew voters is probably due to the fact that the group harbors both conservative and progressive liberals. For example, in the Netherlands, the multiculturalist and social-liberal party D66 is a member of Renew, but so is the increasingly conservative VVD, the party of current Prime Minister Mark Rutte, which is about to embark on a radical-right government coalition with the Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders.
50% of non-voters favor restrictive migration policies (with 32% against). They are relatively similar to EPP-voters.
Figure 4: The environment
Note: Respondents could indicate what they think about environmental protection on a scale ranging from 0 (“Environmental protection should take priority even at the cost of economic growth”) to 10 (“Economic growth should take priority even at the cost of environmental protection”). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Environment”, value 5 into “In between” and the values 6-10 into “Growth”.
A third important issue in the EU is environmental policies. The Von der Leyen Commission has advanced an ambitious Green New Deal through the Parliament and the Council. In the past year, however, critical voices have emerged, particularly among farmers. In response, the Commission and Council have responded by watering down nature and biodiversity policies.
Figure 4 shows that, as expected, supporters of the Greens are the most environmentally conscious. 82% of them prioritize environmental protection over economic growth. From left to right, these percentages slowly decrease: 72% among The Left supporters, 66% among S&D voters, 62% among Renew voters, 59% among EPP supporters, and 50% and 48% respectively for ECR and ID voters.
This pattern closely resembles the one in the previous graph about immigration. The big difference is that on immigration people have more right-wing attitudes across the board, while on the environment voters are much more left-wing. For example, among ECR and ID supporters, about half still prioritize environmental protection over economic growth, while less than a quarter oppose more restrictive immigration policies.
Those who did not vote during the previous elections are, compared to those wo did vote, neither particularly environmental nor clearly anti-environmental.
Figure 5: Same-sex marriages
Note: Respondents could indicate what they think about same-sex marriages on a scale ranging from 0 (“You fully favour same-sex marriages”) to 10 (“You fully oppose same-sex marriages”). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Favor”, value 5 into “In between” and the values 6-10 into “Oppose”.
The EU’s role in traditional moral issues is very limited. While the EU enacts anti-discrimination policies, such as making it illegal to discriminate against homosexuals in hiring, marriage law remains outside the EU’s competence. Nonetheless, the division between morally progressive and conservative parties is a classical division in Europe.
Supporters of The Left and the Greens are most strongly supportive of same-sex marriages (see Figure 5). On average, 69% of The Left’s supporters and 72% of the Greens’ supporters are in favor, while only 22% (Greens) to 23% (The Left) oppose it. The supporter bases of Renew and S&D are slightly more conservative when it comes to same-sex marriages. On average, they are still supportive, but with 56% (Renew) and 58% (S&D), much less so than the supporters of the more left-wing groups. About 30%-31% of these voters oppose same-sex marriages.
Among EPP and ID voters, support for same-sex marriages is lower. Only 42% of the voters for parties in these groups support same-sex marriages, while 46% (EPP) to 49% (ID) oppose them. The most conservative voters are those who support the ECR. More than half of ECR supporters (53%) oppose same-sex marriages, while only 35% approve of them. The ‘C’ in ECR indeed seems to attract the more conservative voters.
Interestingly, non-voters are quite right-wing when it comes to an ethical issue like same-sex marriages. Those who did not vote during the 2019 EP elections do not differ much from the EPP and ID voters. 43% of them oppose same-sex marriages and 43% supports them.
Interestingly, non-voters are quite right-wing on ethical issues like same-sex marriage. Those who did not vote in the 2019 EP elections have similar views to EPP and ID voters. 43% of them oppose same-sex marriages and 43% support them.
Figure 6: Left-right self-identification
Note: Respondents could indicate their position on a left-right scale ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). We recoded the values 0-4 into “Left”, value 5 into “Center” and the values 6-10 into “Right”.
Views on economics, the environment, migration, and cultural issues can be summarized into a left-right dimension. Voters can easily place themselves on such a scale. A majority of those who vote for left-wing groups in the European Parliament position themselves on the left as well. This is particularly true for supporters of The Left, with 73% describing themselves as left-wing and only 9% as right-wing. Voters for the Greens and S&D also position themselves on the left, but in smaller numbers: 56% of Greens and 57% of S&D voters fall into the ‘left’ category, while only 19% of Greens and 17% of S&D voters identify as right-wing.
The differences with right-wing parties are pronounced. A majority of all right-wing group supporters identify as right-wing: 51% of Renew voters, 64% of EPP voters, and 75% of ECR and ID voters. Only a few voters of these parties position themselves as left-wing: 20% of Renew voters, 12% of EPP voters, 7% of ECR voters, and 6% of ID voters. It should not come as a surprise that ECR, ID, and EPP voters position themselves as right-wing. It might be more surprising, however, that voters for the centrist Renew group position themselves as right-wing much more often than left-wing (51% versus 20%).
The left-right pattern among non-voters is very interesting. Two things stand out. First, the share of non-voters that position themselves as right-wing is exactly as large as the share that considers themselves left-wing (31%). Second, the percentage of people who place themselves in the center of the scale is much larger among non-voters than among the different groups of voters: 35% versus 18%-29%.
Conclusion
In the coming European elections, voters face the choice of what kind of Europe they want. One with a strong state regulating the economy to protect consumers, workers and the environment, or one that unleashes the potential for innovation and investment that the free market offers. One that supports a stronger unification, or one where member states have a greater say. One that embraces diversity in all its forms, or one that protects a more traditional way of life from outside influences and progressive ideas.
In 2019, European voters generally chose parties aligned with their preferences on these issues. On the left, a relatively uniform profile emerges. Voters for The Left, Greens, and S&D envision a Europe where the government intervenes in the economy, particularly to protect the environment. They support an open approach to migration and tolerance of homosexuality. However, there is division over EU integration; while voters for The Left group are more skeptical, a plurality still favors further EU integration.
On the right, we see two different visions. Voters for the EPP and Renew support a more united Europe but favor more restrictive immigration policies compared to left-wing parties. They prefer less government intervention in the economy. Voters for these two groups are divided though when it comes to same-sex marriage. Further to the right, voters for the ID and ECR groups want less EU integration, less immigration, and oppose same-sex marriage, but are divided on the role of the state in the economy.
Non-voters do not have a pronounced profile. Compared to those who vote, they are less enthusiastic about EU integration and same-sex marriage. On other issues, and in terms of left-right self-identification, they tend to be more centrist.
Notes
Usually we only publish in Dutch on Stuk Rood Vlees. This short series forms a one-time (or actually three-time) exception.
Methodological justification
For the analyses, we made use of the 2019 European Election Study (EES) Voter Study. This large-scale survey was conducted after the elections to the EP in 2019 in all 28 member states of the EU. The data were collected by Gallup International. The sample size is about 1,000 in each country. For more information about the dataset see here.
All participants was asked the following question: “The European Parliament elections were held on Thursday 23 May 2019. For one reason or another, some people in [country] did not vote in these elections. Did you vote in the recent European Parliament elections?”. If the answer was yes, it was followed by this question: “Which party did you vote for in the European Parliament elections?”
The answering categories were formed by the national parties people could vote for. We replaced these values by the European groups these parties are members of. We dropped the UK from our analyses, and used weights to make sure the sample is representative on key characteristics like age, gender, urbanity, region, education, turnout and vote recall.
Note that because of rounding, some of the percentages in the bar charts add up to more than 100%.
Ronald Heijman zegt
Not the above mentionned 400 million, but 261 million people have the right to vote for the EU parliament.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election/newep/nl/tctp.htm
We see clearly an EU trend of differentiation of political cultural preferences between constructive and conservative political groups, which we see in almost every EU country.
As we see an upcoming trend of conservative-populist political culture all over the EU, we may expect a stronger representation of conservative-populist political parties in EU parliament. Traditional political parties have failed to deliver solutions for major structural problems.
The weak point of EU politics is, that to little people are informed about the many strong advantages of th EU, for the EU area, countries, companies, workers and individuals.
Populist political parties take advantage of this by “easy” solutions, misleading rhetoric and lies about EU. Their main goals are not constructive politics for the future of people, companies, society and environment, but on a power base for an autocratic political system. And with that demolition of our democratic and constitutional institutions. In order to reinforce their autocratic power and cultural war against the so called “elite”. And power back for national interests.
This is a major risk for the EU area in a rapidly becoming vurnerable economic and geo political situation, and unsafe and insecure world.