European Electorates Explored (III): Ideas about politics

The European Parliament elections, taking place between 6 and 9 June, are fast approaching. Understanding who votes for which political group can help us better understand European politics. In this series, “European Electorates Explored”, we dive into the data with a series of graphs that reveal several characteristics of the voters supporting different political groups in the European Parliament. Today, we examine the voter bases of these groups by focusing on their attitudes about politics. What differences emerge across these categories?

Next week, more than 400 million people will have the opportunity to cast their votes for members of the European Parliament (EP). There are eight main groups in the EP: from left to right these are the far-left “The Left” group, the Greens – European Free Alliance, which unites greens with smaller pro-European left-wing parties, the social-democratic Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe group, the European People’s Party (EPP), that unites Christian-democrats and pro-European conservatives, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), that brings together Eurosceptic conservatives and a number of far-right parties, and the fully-fledged far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) group. There is also a group of parties that do not belong to one of these groups: the Non-Inscrits. During the last election, about half of the voters cast their vote for a party but the largest bloc of voters stayed at home and did not vote.

Although much is known about these groups and their member parties, we know very little about the overall characteristics of their voter bases. In this short series of blog posts, we will provide an overview using data from the European Election Study – a large-scale survey conducted just after the previous EP elections in 2019 (for more information, see the methodological justification below).

In Part I of this series, we examined the sociodemographic characteristics of the different voter bases, and in Part II we explored their ideas about important political topics. In this third and final piece, we focus on voters’ ideas about politics. How interested in politics are they? How satisfied are they with their national and EU democratic systems? How much do they trust their national and European parliaments? And how strongly do they support liberal democracy?

Let’s start with political interest.

Figure 1: Political interest

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they are interested in politics on a scale ranging from 1 (“Very interested”) to 4 (“Not at all interested”). We recoded this into a three-point scale.

In 2019, about half of those eligible to vote turned out during the elections – much less than during national elections. Elections to the European Parliament are considered second-order elections that most citizens see as much less important than those at the national level. The European Union is a very complex political entity to which many citizens feel a large distance.

Figure 1 above shows that those who stayed home in 2019 are also the least interested in politics. One in four non-voters is not at all interested in politics, while among those who voted, this share is four times smaller (6%-7%). Only 6% of non-voters are very interested in politics compared to 19%-21% of those who went to the voting booth.

One other thing stands out in this graph: there are virtually no differences between the different voter bases. They’re almost equally interested in politics.   

Figure 2: Satisfaction with democracy at the national level

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a scale ranging from 1 (“Very satisfied”) to 4 (“Not at all satisfied”). We recoded this into a three-point scale.

Although the variation in political interest across groups is minimal, the different voter bases differ from each other when it comes to how satisfied they are with their national democracies. Figure 2 indicates that voters for the Greens and Renew are most satisfied. A majority of the voters supporting member parties of those groups are satisfied (60% among Greens voters and 58% among Renew voters).

Supporters of S&D, the EPP and the ECR are less satisfied. 47% of EPP voters, 48% of ECR voters, and 50% of S&D voters are satisfied with their national democracies. On the fringes of the political spectrum, voters are much less satisfied. 39% of those who support The Left are satisfied, and 34% of ID supporters. The least satisfied are the non-voters; 70% of them are not satisfied.

Figure 3: Satisfaction with democracy at the EU level

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they are satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union on a scale ranging from 1 (“Very satisfied”) to 4 (“Not at all satisfied”). We recoded this into a three-point scale.

When we look at satisfaction with democracy in the European Union (Figure 3), we see some interesting differences and similarities compared to the national level: at the flanks, voters are less satisfied with the EU than with their own national democracy. For the Left, 39% was satisfied with democracy at the national level compared to 25% at the EU level. The Greens show a similar though smaller difference, with 60% being satisfied with democracy nationally and 56% at the EU level. For ECR, there is also a difference, with 48% being satisfied at the national level and 41% at the EU level. For ID, the difference is even starker, with 34% being satisfied with democracy at the national level and only 16% at the EU level.

For EPP voters, the pattern is reversed. They are more satisfied with democracy at the EU level than at the national level: 47% of them were satisfied with democracy in their own country, compared to 56% with democracy at the EU level. For S&D and Renew voters, there is no difference.

Curiously, those who did not vote are more satisfied with democracy at the EU level than with democracy at the national level. Still, these numbers are quite low (35% and 30%).

Figure 4: Trust in the national parliament

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they trust their national parliament on a scale ranging from 1 (“Yes totally”) to 5 (“No, not at all”). We recoded this into a three-point scale.

We see a relatively similar pattern compared to satisfaction with democracy at the national level if we look at the extent to which people trust their national parliament (see Figure 4). Voters of the Greens are most trusting (49% of them trust their parliament and 25% don’t). Trust is also high among S&D and Renew supporters, with 49%-50% saying that they trust their parliament. However, among these groups, the share that does not express trust is slightly higher than among the Greens: 30% and 29%, respectively. EPP voters are also relatively trustful: 45% are trustful versus 34% not.

Voters for The Left show lower levels of trust (only 39% trust their parliament, while 38% don’t). To the far right of the spectrum, percentages are even lower: 32% of ECR supporters and 28% of ID voters trust their national parliaments, while 43% and 44%, respectively, do not trust these institutions. Non-voters are the least trustful, with 21% expressing trust and 54% expressing no trust.

Figure 5: Trust in the European Parliament

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they trust the European Parliament on a scale ranging from 1 (“Yes totally”) to 5 (“No, not at all”). We recoded this into a three-point scale.

For trust in the European Parliament, we see a similar pattern as for satisfaction with EU-level democracy (see Figure 5): supporters of mainstream parties show more faith in this EU institution than in their national parliament, while supporters of parties on the flanks see the opposite pattern.

The supporters of ID parties show a really stark contrast: only 28% of them trusted the national parliament, compared to 11% trusting the EP (17 percentage points less). For the Left, this is 8 percentage points less (from 39% to 31%). For the ECR, trust in the EP is 5 percentage points lower than trust in the national parliament (from 32% to 27%). For the Greens, this difference is only 3 percentage points (from 49% to 46%).

The supporters of the mainstream parties show the opposite pattern: only 45% of EPP supporters trust their national parliament, compared to 55% that trust the EP: 10 percentage points more support for the EU-level institution. For Renew, this is 7 percentage points more (from 50% to 57%). For S&D, this is only 3 percentage points more (from 49% to 52%).

Non-voters again have more faith in Brussels than in their national capital, although the general trust is low (21% trust in the national parliament and 24% in the EP).  

Figure 6: Independent judges

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they agree with the statement: “Independent judges should be able to overrule the decisions of democratically elected government if the decisions violate the rights of individuals or groups in society.” We rescaled the original five-points scale to a three-points scale.

In addition to these general attitudes about politics, we examined several more concrete ideas about liberal democracy. First, voters have been asked to indicate to what extent they believe independent judges should be able to overrule the decisions of democratically elected governments if those decisions violate the rights of individuals or groups.

A majority in all voter bases agrees with this statement, but there exist some interesting differences with regards to the extent to which this is the case (see Figure 6). A gap between the mainstream and far-left groups on the one hand and the far-right groups on the other hand manifests itself. 60% or more of the supporters of The Left, the Greens, S&D, Renew, and the EPP, support the idea of independent judges who can overrule decisions of democratically elected governments. Non-voters resemble those who’ve voted for the mainstream parties: 61% agree and 13% disagree.

Supporters of the groups that harbor far-right parties support this idea less strongly: 52% of ECR voters support it, compared to 50% of ID voters. These voters also express disagreement with this claim more often than those in other groups. 25% of ECR and ID supporters disagree, compared to 9%-18% for supporters of parties in the other groups.

Figure 7: Strong leader

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they agree with the statement: “Having a strong leader in government is good for [country] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.” We rescaled the original five-points scale to a three-points scale.

We see a very similar pattern if we examine the extent to which respondents agree with the idea that having a strong leader in government is good for the country even if this leader bends the rules to get things done. Before we examine the differences, it is important to emphasize that it is relatively shocking that only among the Greens’ supporters does a majority disagree with this claim. This is not good news for those of us who believe in the importance of liberal democracy.

The good news is that supporters of most groups more often disagree than agree with this claim. This is true for supporters of the Greens (52% versus 26%), S&D (49% versus 32%), The Left (47% versus 29%), the EPP (44% versus 34%), and Renew (43% versus 35%). This also holds for the non-voters, even though the difference is less pronounced here: 39% versus 34%.

The pattern looks different if we focus on supporters of the ECR and ID groups. Among them, agreement with the idea that having a strong leader is good for the country even if that person bends the rules is more widespread than disagreement. 45% of ECR supporters agree, while 35% disagree. This pattern is even more pronounced among ID voters: 48% agree, while only 26% disagree.

Figure 8: People, not politicians

Note: Respondents could indicate to what extent they agree with the statement: “The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.” We rescaled the original five-points scale to a three-points scale.

The pattern is slightly different when we examine to what extent respondents think ‘the people’ (and not politicians) should make the most important political decisions. In Figure 8 we see a pattern that was also visible in the graphs representing attitudes about EU politics: on the one hand, we have the mainstream groups (now including the Greens) and on the other hand, the more radical groups on both the left and the right (including the non-voters).

First, it is important to emphasize that voters for all groups are much more in favor of decision-making by the people than by politicians. Overall, the share that agrees with the claim is much higher than the share that disagrees. And this is true for all the voter bases. Yet the extent to which decision-making by the people is supported differs.

Those who support The Left, the ECR, ID, and those who have not voted, are more strongly in favor of decision-making by the people than those who support the other parties. The percentage of people agreeing with the claim that the people should make the most important policy decisions ranges between 56% and 66% (among ID supporters). Those who support the Greens, S&D, Renew, and the EPP are less strongly in favor: between 44% and 51% support this claim.

Conclusion

Where it comes to attitudes towards democracy, the general patterns are a sobering reminder that liberal democracy is not generally supported. A substantial segment of voters believes that a strong leader is good for their country. Only the supporters of the Greens did not agree with this in majority. Many voters would also prefer to make more important decisions themselves. Support for a strong leader and citizen participation was strongest in the right-wing ECR and ID. These are also the groups that are most opposed to a role for judges in the political process, although notably the supporters of all parties in majority supported this safeguard of individual rights.

All in all, we see basically three groups of parties. Firstly, there are the supporters of the three mainstream parties: liberals, social-democrats, and Christian-democrats. The supporters of Renew, S&D, and EPP are satisfied with democracy at the EU level and tend to trust the European Parliament. They tend to be comparatively positive about democracy in their own country and the national parliament as well, although the EPP voters in particular are more skeptical. When it comes to their view of democracy, they believe in majority that independent judges have a role to play, tend to be supportive of citizen involvement, but are less supportive of strong leaders. All in all, these are the supporters of liberal democracy in the EU.

On their right, we find parties with a starkly different view: the voters of the ID group and ECR have a different vision of democracy than the supporters of the mainstream parties. They believe that democracy should focus on the people, and many of them see a role for strong leaders. They are less supportive of judges. They do not trust their national political institutions, and trust European institutions even less.

The two groups on the left (The Left and the Greens) have a more complex profile: both have more faith in national political institutions than European ones, although supporters of The Left have little faith in either, and the Greens have more faith in both. They support liberal democracy, oppose authoritarian leadership, but are divided on the question of whether citizens should have a greater say. All in all, they stand closer to the mainstream than to the far right.

Finally, non-voters are primarily characterized by their disinterest in political institutions. They are a curious bunch: they have greater faith in European institutions that they did not vote for than in their national institutions, which many of them did vote for. They believe in majority that citizens should make important decisions, but did not take the opportunity to have their say in the composition of the EP.

Notes

Usually we only publish in Dutch on Stuk Rood Vlees. This short series forms a one-time (or actually three-time) exception.

Methodological justification

For the analyses, we made use of the 2019 European Election Study (EES) Voter Study. This large-scale survey was conducted after the elections to the EP in 2019 in all 28 member states of the EU. The data were collected by Gallup International. The sample size is about 1,000 in each country. For more information about the dataset see here.

All participants was asked the following question: “The European Parliament elections were held on Thursday 23 May 2019. For one reason or another, some people in [country] did not vote in these elections. Did you vote in the recent European Parliament elections?”. If the answer was yes, it was followed by this question: “Which party did you vote for in the European Parliament elections?”

The answering categories were formed by the national parties people could vote for. We replaced these values by the European groups these parties are members of. We dropped the UK from our analyses, and used weights to make sure the sample is representative on key characteristics like age, gender, urbanity, region, education, turnout and vote recall. Note that because of rounding, some of the percentages in the bar charts add up to more than 100%.